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Institutionalization of financial mechanisms 
A B S T R A C T   
In this paper, we explore the development of financing and subsidies for renewable energy in three fossil-fuelled 
European countries: Poland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Financing for renewable energy is an 
existing arena involving multi-actor activities and practices that develop and implement (innovative) financial 
instruments to facilitate investments in renewable energy. This means that the paper focuses on different 
financial mechanisms – such as grants, awards, subsidies, crowdfunding, community bonds, ventures, social 
investment, as long as these funding instruments finance sustainable energy infrastructure and activities. The 
extent to which this is changing social relations and comes with new ways of doing, thinking and/or organizing is 
an empirical topic explicitly examined in the study. We first briefly define and conceptualize financial mecha-
nisms and subsidies before explicating our mixed methods research design consisting of scoping, document 
analysis, 22 original expert interviews, and observational data from eight meetings and events. We then compare 
the recent history of solar and wind energy financing and subsidies in our three countries. These comparative 
cases reveal the temporality of subsidization, indicating fundamental changes in the patterns and logics of 
financing over the past two decades. They reveal shifts in authority and an expansion of actors involved in 
financing. They lastly reveal tensions and contestations in financing, including gaps in coverage and conflicts 
among stakeholder groups. We conclude with future insights for renewable energy diffusion, innovation, and 
policy.   
1. Introduction 
Financing, economic instruments and subsidies for renewable energy 
play a central role in the generation, commercialization and diffusion of 
low-carbon energy technology innovations [1–4]. Financial mechanisms 
can even be considered social innovations that are changing social re-
lations and come with new ways of doing, thinking and/or organizing 
energy supply and use [5–7]. Financing for renewable energy involves 
multiple actors (from government, municipalities to charities, banks, 
investment funds, firms), activities and practices that develop and 
implement (innovative) financial instruments to facilitate resources for 
investment in renewable energy. Access to different financial and 
investment mechanisms even allows households or cooperative mem-
bers to undertake new roles in the energy sector. 
Financing amounts for renewable energy are also expected to grow 
considerably over the next few decades as the global energy sector de-
carbonizes. For example, a decarbonized global energy sector is pro-
jected to need cumulative investments of at least $110 trillion between 
now and 2050, representing an average of 2% of global GDP per year in 
perpetuity [8]. Similarly, the International Finance Corporation exam-
ined the national commitments submitted by 21 emerging market 
countries as part of the Paris Agreement, and found they needed $23 
trillion in investment if they would achieve their targets by 2030; the 
total amount of infrastructure investment required across all countries 
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surpassed $90 trillion [9]. 
Consequently, patterns of financing and subsidization are urgently 
needed to meet climate targets even as they alter the relations between 
actors, infrastructure, and institutions governing the energy system. By 
facilitating this change, financing trends pressure incumbents in the 
energy sector, forcing them to redefine their strategies in face of new-
comers discovering new niches in previously homogeneous systems 
[10]. An important example is the new role of individuals who turn from 
passive consumers of electricity to prosumers engaged both in con-
sumption, production, and exchange of the electricity [11–13]. This 
particular change demands not only access to the appropriate technol-
ogies and enabling legislation, but also the access to the financial re-
sources necessary to cover the investment costs. The form and scale of 
these financial mechanisms has a decisive impact on who can take part 
in the transformation and who remains excluded. The evolution of these 
mechanisms provides important insight on the role of both outside 
institutional pressures and the institutional work conducted by field 
actors. 
In this paper we empirically explore how three primarily fossil- 
fuelled European countries attempt to finance and support the matura-
tion and diffusion of renewable energy technologies such as wind energy 
and solar power. We investigate the evolution of wind and solar 
financing and subsidies – such as grants, awards, crowdfunding, com-
munity bonds, ventures, social investment – in Poland, the Netherlands, 
and the UK. Our aim is to offer a confirmatory paper grounded in 
original empirical data from a comparative set of cases, rather than to 
offer a more exploratory approach emphasizing theoretical or concep-
tual development. 
The article proceeds as follows. It first defines and conceptualizes 
financial mechanisms and subsidies and indicates gaps in the literature 
before explicating its mixed methods research design. It then compares 
the recent history of solar and wind energy subsidies in Poland, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These comparative cases reveal 
the temporality of subsidization, indicating fundamental changes in the 
patterns and logics of financing over the past two decades. They reveal 
shifts in authority and an expansion of actors involved in financing. They 
lastly reveal tensions and contestations in financing, including gaps in 
coverage and conflicts among stakeholder groups. The paper concludes 
with future insights for both research and policy. 
2. Literature review and background: Financing, subsidies, and 
renewable energy 
The broad focus of our paper lies in the domain of literatures con-
nected to both “financing” flows for clean energy as well as “subsidies” 
for specific renewable energy technologies. Financing refers most 
generally to the provision of funding to a person, project, policy, or 
enterprise. The closely related term of “finance” relates to the study of 
the system of money, investments, and other financial instruments, with 
the literature distinguishing between public finance (borrowing by and 
from governments), corporate finance (borrowing by and from firms), 
and personal finance (borrowing by and from individuals and house-
holds) [14]. A subsidy is closely related to financing, and refers to a form 
of support, assistance, or financial aid often flowing from a government 
or state provider to a person or company, with the most visible and 
common form a grant but numerous other types including tax in-
centives, price controls, and rebates [15]. Subsidies, for example, 
represent widely used policy mechanisms that can funnel public re-
sources into neglected areas of infrastructure and development, accel-
erate innovation, or achieve various social or technological goals 
including low-income assistance or providing social safety nets [16]. In 
classic terms, subsidies can “supply push” improvements in technical 
performance via innovations in manufacturing or design, or they can 
“demand pull” improvements in the ability for households or institutions 
to purchase and use renewable energy technologies [17–19]. In simpler 
terms, subsidies are usually policy mechanisms that funnel public 
resources; financial mechanisms are market-based mechanisms. 
Over the past century, how energy systems, and renewable energy 
projects in particular, have been financed, owned, and operated has 
changed considerably. Throughout much of the early history of the 
electricity sector, both energy supply and transmission and distribution 
grids were run by state entities (state-owned companies) or monopolies. 
Much of this shifted in the 1980s and 1990s as privatization, liber-
alization, and electricity market restructuring altered financial flows 
from governments to private entities [20]; ownership also pivoted from 
states to firms and investors [21]. Whereas most renewable energy 
projects in the earlier era of monopolies and highly regulated markets 
were developed, owned, and financed by utilities or states, in the 
modern era of restructuring and liberalization, non-utility generators 
have entered the market along with independent power providers and a 
host of other distributed actors [22]. 
These shifts in market structure and ownership necessitated that 
renewable energy providers begin to build relationships with providers 
of capital and new forms of finance and investment [23]. This corre-
sponded with a new spectrum of financial providers and types of 
finance, one that included actors as diverse as corporations, retail in-
vestors, hedge funds, private equity firms, banks, insurance companies, 
endowments and pension funds [23]. These new entities offer a diversity 
of financial options to renewable energy firms including feed-in tariffs 
and renewable portfolio standards [24], as well as debt instruments 
(loans and bonds) along with a wide range of different credit and 
repayment schemes and leverage options, one of the most attractive of 
which are “green bonds” [25]. McInerney and Johannsdottir [26] even 
go as far as to claim that “private finance will be a key enabler of the low 
carbon transition.” 
Nevertheless, attaining finance adequate to both meet climate policy 
targets but also catalyze successful and self-sustaining renewable energy 
markets has been wrought with challenges. In 2009, developed coun-
tries promised to disburse at least $100 billion in financing every year to 
promote climate change mitigation among developing countries 
through the Green Climate Fund; actual investment levels in 2019 have 
even surpassed this amount by reaching about $455 annually [27]. Such 
figures may sound impressive, but it falls well short of the anticipated 
need for finance or investment five times greater at $2.4 trillion [27]. 
Brunnschweiler [28] provocatively notes a paradox concerning the 
financing of renewable energy given that it requires smaller volumes of 
investment (due to more decentralized and modular installation ca-
pacities compared to large centralized power plants) but also sees more 
difficulty in securing finance. This is due partly to resistance from 
incumbent fossil fuel providers from investing in renewables, partly to 
the need for renewables to require longer term loans, and party because 
many renewable energy firms are small and medium enterprises that 
banks find risker to loan funds to. 
Given these conundrums of finance and policy, many key questions 
and gaps remain in the literature. Hall et al. [29] argue that even though 
the amount of finance needed to promote low-carbon transitions will be 
large when accumulated over decades, peer-reviewed studies looking at 
financing patterns in practice are rare. Geddes and Schmidt [30] simi-
larly argue that energy finance is a blind spot within most studies 
looking at renewable energy or low-carbon transitions. This is prob-
lematic, given that successful financing of renewable energy necessitates 
a stronger evidence base concerning the empirical relationship between 
different types of financial mechanisms and how they shape willingness 
for countries to actually invest in renewable energy [31]. In this way, 
renewable energy finance is a critically important object of scholastic 
inquiry given that closing the financing gap is a “major issue” for both 
energy transitions and climate policy [32]. Redirecting finance towards 
renewable energy could even be construed as one of society’s “grand 
challenges.” And yet our assessment of this literature reveals that most 
existing studies take a single country focus (e.g., United States, China), a 
single technology focus (e.g., offshore wind only, utility-scale solar 
only), and/or examine only a limited number of instruments (e.g., a 
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green bond, a feed-in tariff, an auction scheme in isolation). 
In this paper, we seek to tackle these gaps head on by offering a 
comparative study of multiple financial mechanisms for multiple types of 
renewable energy that have contributed to the diffusion of wind and 
solar energy in three European countries – Poland, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. Admittedly, “financial mechanisms” is not a phrase 
with a precise and widely understood definition; we suggest that it en-
compasses both finance, the ways in which activities are ‘financed’ 
through debt, equity, subsidies or grants (in the sense of [33]), and the 
revenue streams that the activities generate. Our main focus is on the 
former; subsidies for renewable energy are the key mechanisms here as 
government support for alternative sources of energy has been crucial 
for development of the sector in all three countries. 
The decision was made to restrict the scope of the study by looking at 
the financial flows which have supported the creation of wind and solar 
photovoltaic (PV) energy generation. Solar and wind energy have a 
number of technical similarities compared with other sustainable energy 
sources (which helps keep the story of their financing manageable), but 
also some notable differences of relevance to social relations involved. 
Key similarities are:  
- they produce no direct greenhouse gases in operation [34];  
- they are variable energy sources, unlike baseload plants, and require 
grids that can handle greater degrees of intermittency [35];  
- they harness ambient flows of energy in their surroundings at zero 
marginal cost, which means much of the ongoing cost associated 
with an installation is cost of the capital used to finance its con-
struction [36];  
- wind and solar are well-developed technologies and have gone 
through all stages of commercialization – from early pilot de-
velopments to wide adoption and commercialization [17,18,37–40, 
75]. This makes them well placed to trace the evolution of subsidies 
and financial mechanisms, which were obviously evolving as the 
technologies matured;  
- compared to other systems (e.g. hydroelectric dams, natural gas 
turbines, coal boilers, steam engines), the maturation of these tech-
nologies has occurred over roughly similar timeframes with notable 
cost reductions (as well as improvements in learning) over the last 
ten years, or projected into the future [17,18,41,42];  
- these cost reductions can not only improve technical performance 
and efficiency, more deployment can also lower the cost of capital 
itself [43]. 
Notwithstanding these defining attributes, solar PV, onshore wind 
and offshore wind differ markedly in their economies of scale, and this is 
reflected in the distribution of installation sizes that we see for each 
technology. For example, in the UK and in Poland while there are many 
solar farms above 5 MW, there are also hundreds of thousands of solar 
PV systems under 10 kW capacity, many of which are installed on in-
dividual homes and in many cases owned by individual households. In 
the UK, there are thousands of onshore wind installations, ranging from 
individual turbines to the 539 MW Whitelee Wind Farm in Scotland (the 
largest in the UK). There are tens of offshore wind farms. With the 
exception of pilot schemes these are above 60 MW and the largest to date 
is 1200 MW. At the same time in Poland, the development of wind 
onshore installations was virtually stopped in 2016 with so-called “Anti- 
Wind Turbine Act” after few years of dynamic development and 
reaching of 6000 MW of total capacity. In the Netherlands, greater 
community awareness over environmental concerns, the presence of 
grassroots initiatives, and a generally stronger level of trust in renewable 
energy companies and institutions has also driven an expansion of the 
sector [44,45]. Dutch planners have particularly focused on developing 
onshore wind, residential solar energy, and bioenergy [46]. 
Perhaps equally important, wind and solar are ideal to study from a 
financial mechanisms and subsidies perspective because they require far 
more financing than fossil fuel facilities per unit of installed capacity. As 
Schmidt [36] notes, wind and solar in particular are more capital 
intensive than their fossil-fuelled counterparts, they are less operations 
or fuel intensive, and they require more capital investment. Indeed, 
Fig. 1 shows that compared to fossil fuels, renewable energy sources 
need far, far greater amounts of finance, in some cases up to five times 
more than coal and four times more than gas fired power plants. This 
makes them ideal candidates to study when it comes to evaluating the 
efficacy and dynamics of financial instruments and subsidy flows. Wind 
and solar may also be more dependent on foreign direct investment, 
especially in emerging or less established markets, than other forms of 
energy technology [47]. 
Moreover, as the ‘fuel’ is free and maintenance relatively inexpen-
sive, most of the labour and materials used to produce solar or wind 
power are deployed before the generation asset is commissioned, and a 
substantial part of the revenue will go towards the cost of the capital 
(both debt and equity) used to reach that point. Following the UNEP 
‘Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment’ reports it is useful to 
divide the creation of a new renewable energy generation asset into two 
main phases separated by the ‘final investment decision’ (FID) at which 
time the necessary financial commitments have been made for con-
struction to begin [48]. 
Reaching the FID involves (among other things) the identification of 
a suitable site; establishing the rights required to build and connect the 
asset from the owner of the site, planning authorities, etc.; finding 
sources of financing for construction; establishing contracts necessary 
for the construction, connection, and operation of the asset. After the 
FID, construction is generally lower risk. Equity in the project could 
potentially be issued or change hands in an acquisition at any stage. 
Given the changing type and level of risk over the life of a project, it is 
also common for projects to be refinanced. 
Once the asset has been commissioned, the revenues it receives 
typically involve the sale of electrical energy which might be done on a 
transaction basis in a market, but which is often done through longer 
term power purchase agreements (PPA). In addition, revenue may be 
supported by a variety of subsidy mechanisms (e.g. a Feed-in Tariff). The 
revenue streams that will be available are typically of great interest to a 
project’s financial backers, for obvious reasons. 
In the sections to come, we will explore how three European coun-
tries—Poland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—utilize a mix 
of these different policies to support wind and solar energy facilities. In 
order to make renewable energy more attractive to financial providers, 
policy instruments often act to increase returns, reduce risks, or stimu-
late new markets or sources of revenue [2]. Policy instruments thus 
become coupled to financial mechanisms. Table 1 summarizes financing 
mechanisms and subsidies for renewable energy that we will explore in 
our three countries. They fall into two broad categories: (1) direct sub-
sidies and other EU/government-backed financial instruments; (2) 
market-based mechanisms. Some mechanisms are universal (e.g. 
crowdfunding), some are only appropriate in specific economic and 
country contexts (e.g. EU funding in Poland). 
But first, it is important to better explain how we selected our three 
countries and how we collected original data for our analysis. 
3. Comparative and mixed methods research design 
To explore the evolution of renewable energy subsidies in Europe, we 
relied on a comparative case study approach. Three specific countries 
were chosen because they relate to the aims and objectives of a recently 
funded Horizon 2020 project by the European Commission which 
specified such a focus in its approved proposal, but this also possesses 
the advantageous ability to draw from author teams within each of the 
three countries and also familiar with local debates, policy documents, 
and language sources. These three European countries have the benefit 
of differing in terms of location (west and east), energy markets 
(dominated by gas, renewables or coal) and different climates. Table 2 
offers a high level overview of some key indicators for each of these 
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three countries. Extremely relevant for our study, all three countries also 
have very different energy markets. Poland is a transition economy; the 
UK has a mature market-based financial system; the Netherlands is more 
of a ‘bank-based’ financial system. We maintain this offers an authentic 
range of countries in terms of their geographic location, energy sources, 
and climatic conditions. 
With three countries selected, we then executed a mixed-methods 
research design consisting of four distinct methods of data collection 
which ran in parallel:  
1. Scoping: Initial scoping was conducted amongst colleagues across a 
large-scale European project (blinded in acknowledgments) con-
cerning which social innovation initiatives they knew of in the realm 
of finance and subsidization. Further research through search 
Fig. 1. Financing expenditures, equity, and debt ratios for various energy systems. 
Source: [36]. 
Table 1 
Overview of renewable energy subsidy and financial mechanisms examined in 
this study. Source: compiled by the authors.  









financial support (subsidies 
and loans) 
Green Investment Scheme 
(connected to the EU Emission 
Trading System) 
Green Certificates (certificates 
of origin) 
Auction mechanism (replaced 
Green certificate) 
Net-metering (replaced FiT 
before it came to force) 
My Electricity programme 
(subsidy programme funded 
through the Green Investment 
Scheme) 
Tax relief scheme 
Private funds & investments (e. 
g. “collective prosumers”, 
“virtual prosumers”) 
Preferential bank loans (e.g. 
through Bank for 
Environmental Protection 
(Bank Ochrony Środowiska S. 




Netherlands MEP, SDE, SDE+, SDE++
Regional Energy funds 
State loans from promotional 
bank Invest-NL 
Crowdfunding 
Private funds & investments 
United 
Kingdom 
Renewable Obligations (RO) 
Feed-in Tariff (FIT) 
Contracts for difference (CfDs) 
Smart Export Guarantee (SEG) 
(in GB) 
Rural Community Energy Fund 
Urban Community Energy 
Fund 
Tax relief schemes (e.g. EIS, 
VCT, SITR) 
Private funds & investments (e. 
g. institutional investors, Green 




Investment (CMI) model 
Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPAs)  
Table 2 
Core sociodemographic, energy and climate change data for our three selected 
countries.   
Poland Netherlands United 
Kingdom 
Population (millions of people) a 38.39 17.35 66.834 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP, 
adjusted to purchasing power parity, 
millions of US$) a 
566.71 840.99 3,255,483 
Total primary energy supply (million 
tons of oil equivalent) a 
105.8 72.93 175.21 
Electricity final consumption 
(Terawatt-hours) a 
166.8 117.1 325.93 
Total greenhouse gas emissions 
(million tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent) b 
414.6 195.9 585.8 
Total renewable energy production (in 
Gigawatt-hours) c 
21,651 18,884 108,131  
a International Energy Agency [49]. 
b World Bank [50]; and. 
c International Renewable Energy Agency [73]. 
Source: Authors, based on most recent data from the 
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engines led to a longlist of finance/subsidy/tax/fiscal instruments 
and initiatives in each of the three countries. 
2. Document/literature review: A review of the literature and docu-
ments on this topic was conducted in few stages. First, we used 
Google, Google scholar and ScienceDirect and Nexislexis. Search 
queries were: ‘finance renewable energy’, ‘financing energy transi-
tion’. After the areas of research became clearer, more specific search 
queries were used (e.g. ‘invest-nl’, ‘kfw nederland’, ‘crowdfunding’, 
‘feed-in tariff’, “ulga termomodernizacyjna”, “Mój Prąd”). Given the 
breadth of the subject, rather than conducting a systematic review (i. 
e., reviewing all matches for specific search queries), we took an 
explorative approach and further drew on the interviews to identify 
the trends for each country and looked at the relevant documents 
such as the UNEP/Bloomberg financing renewable energy reports, 
Green Investment Bank reports, the reports produced by trade as-
sociations (e.g., Community Energy England, Solar Trade Associa-
tion), the government reports etc. Following the initial document 
review, more specific queries were made based on these documents. 
3. Interviews: 22 interviews were conducted (See Table A1 in Ap-
pendix) by selection and personal invitation through e-mail and in 
one instance through an open call on LinkedIn in 2020 and 2021. The 
initial approach was to snowball through these interviewees. How-
ever, we wanted to grasp the breadth of innovations and therefore 
interviewees were selected more specifically for their diversity of 
knowledge in this topic. Interviews lasted generally 60–90 min and 
involved a robust mix of different stakeholder types, such as: mu-
nicipality employees, crowdfunding entrepreneurs, civil-society ac-
tors, national government employees, bank fund managers, scholars. 
Our specific research interview questions and analytical protocol are 
shown in Table A3 in the appendix. The interviews were semi- 
structured, lasting between 30 and 180 min, and each adhering to 
the general interview script but also dynamic enough to facilitate 
questions and answers. For both ease of reference and to highlight 
our interview data, we have placed all direct quotes or paraphrased 
analysis from the interviews in italics throughout the manuscript.  
4. Observational data from meetings and events. To supplement the 
document analysis and interviews, the authors also attended eight 
events—all large, public meetings related to either renewable energy 
and/or financing and subsidies— from 2019 to 2020. These events 
were chosen because they were fairly large (a minimum of 10 par-
ticipants and a full program), at a high level (often attended by senior 
policymakers or intermediaries present), open to wide range of 
participants (with representatives from energy and equipment sup-
pliers, regulators, civil society, etc.) and verifiable (most had full 
transcripts, background materials and a briefing booklet). The events 
attended are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. When visiting each 
of the events, the authors performed naturalistic observation, taking 
notes about the meeting and also generating a “transcript” of key 
themes, areas of contention, and questions from the audience. The 
observational evidence collected from these events is useful for 
aiding the understanding of contextual conditions and deeper di-
mensions difficult to collect in static sources such as written texts 
[51]. This observational data was used as an additional source of 
information for understanding the issues around renewable energy 
finance. 
Despite these efforts at triangulation (across mixed methods), our 
study does have certain limitations in terms of a number and types of 
actors represented. Additionally, the Covid-19 pandemic challenged the 
research limiting the amount of participant observation that was 
possible which were mainly used to learn more on the topic of financing. 
Moreover, due to the explorative nature of our study, we have not 
conducted a systematic review of each case study. Therefore, a limita-
tion of this study is that the financing and subsidy mechanisms discussed 
are dependent on the specific networks, context and knowledge of the 
stakeholders we interviewed. Further analysis, which we did not have 
the space to conduct, on issues such as spatial differentiation, urban and 
rural distinctions, cultural embedding, and historical market factors 
behind the patterns identified in our three countries would certainly be 
warranted by future research. 
4. Results: Comparing renewable energy subsidies and financial 
instruments in three countries 
This section presents our initial “Results,” drawn from all four of our 
methods (scoping review, policy review, interviews, observational data) 
and organized as a chronological narrative of how subsidies and finan-
cial mechanisms for wind and solar have emerged and changed over the 
past two decades. We will offer a more thematic discussion of each case 
in Section 5 to come, after we summarize the chronology of our three 
cases. 
4.1. Poland: From vacuum to abundance 
Our chronology introduces the history of subsidies in Poland from 
1989, but focuses mainly on the period of 2015–2020 – the time of a 
relative acceleration of the investment in renewable energy in Poland, 
resulting in the growing proportion of energy from renewable sources in 
the national energy mix. Generally, the country morphed from having 
almost no subsidies in 1989 for renewables to deploying a strong array 
of traditional subsidy mechanisms towards renewables by 2020 (See 
Fig. 2). 
The first phase from 1989 to 2004 saw a vacuum or absence of 
funding mechanisms supporting RE. Before 1989, Poland was proud of 
its coal-based energy system, even if it faced serious problems in 1980’s. 
The project of building the first Polish nuclear power plant was aban-
doned in 1989, leaving the coal power plants almost the sole source of 
electricity. In 1989 the process of political and socio-economic trans-
formation started in Poland, and the so-called Roundtable Talks, a 
dedicated working group focused on ecology (ecological sub-table) was 
set. As our interviewees point out, for twenty years following the 1989 
transformation, the official, political and legal actions towards energy 
transformation and decarbonization were almost totally absent. For years, 
energy was publicly and politically perceived as a key national safety issue, 
hence public debate focused mainly on the problem of energy dependence (gas 
import from Russia). The funds for renewable energy were virtually 
inaccessible. 
A second phase from 2004 to 2015 saw public subsidies for energy 
efficiency from EU funds and debates on the Renewable Energy Sources 
(RES) Act. After Poland joined the EU in 2004, the issues of environment 
and climate protection slowly started to take more prominent place in 
public discourse and in policy-making. The main stream of funds 
devoted to this goal came from dedicated EU funds. The most important 
institution responsible for management and distribution of public funds 
for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects is The National 
Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management (NFEPWM) 
(PL: Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej, 
NFOŚiGW). It has been operating since 1989, first as a special purpose 
fund, and since 2010 as a state legal entity. Its main objective is to 
provide financial support to large projects aimed at environmental 
protection and water management. Central NFEPWM, along with 16 
independent (subordinated to voivodship administration) sub-funds 
with similar goals (Provincial Funds for Environmental Protection and 
Water Management, PFEPWM), constitutes the core of the Polish system 
of financing environmental protection projects. 
Since 2010, NFEPWM has organized the Green Investment Scheme 
(GIS), a derivative of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). Until 2019, it 
anted PLN 530 mln in loans and PLN 586 mln in subsidies, resulting, 
among others, in improvement in thermal efficiency of 1700 public 
buildings, construction of 17 biogas power plants, and connection of 7 
wind power plants to the network. During this time, Poland has also 
come to support “Green Certificates”, or certificates of origin. The 
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system was based on the obligation imposed on energy sellers to obtain 
and submit to the President of the ERO (Energy Regulatory Office; pl: 
URE, Urząd Regulacji Energetyki) a certain number of certificates of 
origin of electricity generated from renewable energy sources (so-called 
“Green Certificates”), or to pay a substitute fee. That is, producers of 
energy from renewable sources had guaranteed the purchase of the 
energy they produced. The system was regulated under Energy Law. In 
this period, there was no dedicated act regulating specifically the 
development and operating of renewable energy sources. The first 
version of the RES Act was proposed in 2011 and were debated for years, 
while civic interest and pressure to allow investment in renewable en-
ergy grew. 
A third phase from 2015 to 2019 saw passing of the RES Act and the 
emergence of auctions, net-metering, and rising electricity prices. After 
years of discussion, RES Act was finally accepted in February 2015. It 
introduced the number of new funding mechanisms. First of all, the 
auction system replaced the Green Certificates system. Second, the Act 
enabled prosumerism. In its first version, it introduced the feed-in tariffs 
system. However, feed-in tariffs never started to be in force because the 
next government, that took over from November 2015, withdrew this 
policy measure and replaced it with net-metering. The RES Act came 
into force on January 1, 2016; since then, it has been amended several 
times. To a certain extent, the RES Act finally responded to a growing 
interest and lobbying towards creating conditions for prosumers in en-
ergy (a category non-existent in Polish legal and energy system before). 
While the RES Act opened the system for prosumers’ participation, it 
is worth stressing that another governmental regulation, the Act on In-
vestments in Wind Farms, called “the anti-windmill law” by the wind 
industry, accepted in 2016, virtually frozen the sector of wind power 
plants. According to the act, it is possible to build a new wind farm at a 
distance of not less than 10 times its height (including blades) from 
residential and mixed buildings and areas particularly valuable from the 
natural point of view (e.g. national parks, landscape parks, reserves). It 
is not possible to expand the existing windmills that do not meet the 
distance criterion - only their renovation and works necessary for their 
proper use are allowed. The act also introduced an increase in taxation 
of new and existing wind farms. The new regulations did not apply to 
wind farms with a capacity of up to 40 kW, i.e. they do not apply to 
micro-installations, and also do not apply to offshore wind farms. 
A final phase from 2019 to today has seen a boom in prosumerism 
and active search for market-based investment models. The year 2019 
signalled the new phase in the field of funding and investment mecha-
nisms in renewable energy in Poland by introducing the number of in-
centives for individuals willing to invest in PV micro-installations.1 In 
July 2019 the Ministries of Energy and of the Environment launched the 
program “My Electricity” dedicated to households who want to become 
prosumers.2 It is a public subsidy programme managed by NFEPWM and 
funded through the Green Investment Scheme. It has been operating 
from July 2019 until December 2020 and is likely be prolonged. It allows 
individuals to receive the subsidy of PLN 5000 (~1200 EUR) for a small 
(2 kW–10 kW) installation of PV on their own roof or grounds. Until 
October 2020, 173,000 applications have been submitted, with an 
average number of 800 applications per day. This has seen solar energy 
grow in Poland significantly, as Fig. 3 shows. Thanks to these pro-
grammes, for the first time Poles became renewable energy investors on 
the mass scale.3 
Another important renewable energy financing mechanism is bank 
loans, including dedicated loans supported by public funds and fully 
commercial loans for investments. Such loans are granted by both 
commercial and special banks, such as Bank Ochrony Środowiska (BOŚ) 
(Bank for Environmental Protection). The above-mentioned initiatives 
are rather traditional when it comes to the mechanisms they employ; 
nevertheless, they support the new ways of thinking, acting and orga-
nizing about energy by enabling new actors to take new roles in the 
energy system, but also by forcing incumbents (mainly, energy pro-
ducers and grid operators) to redefine their strategies in face of new-
comers’ actions. Simultaneously, the instruments dedicated for the 
renewable energy support evolved from certificates of origins to auction 
system and from Feed-in Tariffs (accepted by the parliament, but never 
operating) to net-metering. Finally, in the last years, we can also see the 




2 https://www.gov.pl/web/srodowisko/rusza-program-moj-prad.  
3 https://energyre.pl/pl/2019/09/nowelizacja-ustawy-o-oze-co-warto-wiedz 
iec-na-temat-zmian/. 
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growing efforts to develop market-based financial mechanisms, such as 
investment-based crowdfunding, EPC (energy performance contract-
ing), ESCOs (Energy Service Companies), and innovative instruments 
such as green bonds [52] and local investment cooperatives [53]. 
Despite the fact that they are marginal in quantitative terms, they may 
signal the direction of the sector’s development. 
4.2. Netherlands: The rise and fall of ‘mad Hank’ 
In 1996 to 1998 the EU started liberalization of the energy sector 
with the EU’s First Energy Directive (1996), which was transposed into 
the Electricity and Gas Act of 1998 in the Netherlands (See Fig. 4). Since 
then, the relations between actors in the energy sector changed radi-
cally, shifting ownership from the state to market actors. This marked a 
new role for the government by stimulating the emerging market 
through subsidies. 
The 1990s also saw major shift of attention towards environmental 
concerns, expressed through the treaty of Maastricht (1993), which 
made the environment a formal policy domain, and the treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997), which enforced environmental protection to be 
embedded in all EU sectoral policies in order to promote sustainable 
development. Together, the Electricity and Gas Act and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and Maastricht prescribed a radical shift away from a state- 
based fossil system, to a market-based system committed to sustainable 
development. 
These shifts were met with a cascade of subsidies emerged at the start 
of the new Millennium, aiming to stimulate the production of renewable 
energy. The chosen mechanism was to subsidise the difference between 
the electricity price (the profits of a project) and the cost price of the 
technology (the costs of a project) and thus to take away the ‘unprofit-
able top’ of renewable energy investments as compared to their rela-
tively profitable fossil competitors. This subsidy mechanism was called 
the Stimulation regulation Sustainable Energy Production (NL: Stim-
ulering Duurzame Energiesubsidie, SDE). The SDE subsidy was later 
replaced by the SDE+ (2011) and SDE++ (2020) subsidies. Between 
2020 and 2032, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate has set 
aside €36,9 billion for the SDE and SDE (+/++) (Algemene Reken-
kamer, 2019). 
In the second decade of the 2000s, decentral governments and citi-
zens became increasingly important as financiers of renewable energy. 
Around 2010, local and regional governments sold their shares in their 
local energy utilities, enabling them to invest substantially (tens of 
Fig. 3. Growth of solar power installations in Poland (in MW) 2015–2020.  
Fig. 4. A timeline of renewable energy subsidies and financing in the Netherlands, 1996 to 2021.  
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millions) in renewable energy projects through newly instated regional 
energy funds. Some of the sales of these shares were specifically labelled 
as ‘energy-related’ and were to be invested in the local and regional 
energy transition. In the words of one interviewee: “It was crazy. We 
suddenly had 1 billion Euros on the bank account.” Between 2012 and 
2018, the regional energy funds supplied 400 million euros of financing 
to about 700 renewable energy projects.4 The regional energy funds 
implied a considerable change in the role of local/regional governments: 
from being shareholders in a utility, focusing mainly on subsidization, 
they now had access to funds for energy-labelled loans. 
Decentral governments started shifting away from subsidization, 
towards investment in renewable energy production. Against the back-
ground of ongoing privatization of the energy sector, and in the after-
math of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, subsidization had started to be 
considered as too expensive. As outlined by an Alderman of the city of 
Amsterdam in 2012: “We have become more business-minded. We shouldn’t 
be ‘mad Hank’ who just spends money. We also want to see revenues” [54]. 
Consequently, 2014 to the present indicates decreasing subsidization on 
a decentral level. Nationally, subsidization was also decreasing because 
of technological advancement and market effects. The SDE + subsidy for 
solar panels decreased from ca. 0.14€/kWh in 2014, to ca. 0.10 €/kWh in 
2019. The SDE + subsidy for wind parks at sea marked a considerable 
drop over the years, from 9,15 €/kWh in 2013, to 0 in 2018 when 
Chinook/Vattenfall won the first tender without subsidy for wind park 
Dutch Coast (south) (NL: Hollandse Kust (zuid)) III and IV (See Fig. 5). 
The period between 2010 and 2016 marked a substantial increase in 
financial participation of citizens in the energy transition through en-
ergy cooperatives and crowdfunding campaigns. This can be related to a 
number of policy changes. The 2013 Energy Agreement accorded citi-
zens an important role as in realizing the energy transition through 
collectives (i.e. energy cooperatives) or individual efforts. Consequently, 
from 2013 to 2014 onwards, regional and local governments started to 
give citizens opportunities for (financial) participation in renewable 
energy projects as part of their building and environment permits. 
Meanwhile, the ongoing professionalization of crowdfunding led to 
various record-breaking crowdfunding levels, with 7.7 million euros of 
crowdfunding raised by cooperative Zelfstroom in 2014, and 10 million 
by Windpark Krammer in 2018.5 One aspect of the professionalization 
was the setting up of a crowdfunding platform trade organization, which 
lobbied for the needs of crowdfunding platforms and against the 
dominance of the Dutch banking sector. They hoped to instate a 
mechanism that required banks to refer loan rejected entrepreneurs to 
alternative financiers, inspired by a similar mechanism in the UK. 
However, this mechanism was stopped by the lobby of the existing 
financial sector. The Authority Financial Markets (AFM) started treating 
crowdfunding platforms as professional players in the financial sector 
around 2016 and started to keep them under closer supervision. Later, in 
line with the wider trend to move from subsidization towards invest-
ment, a renewed interest in a national promotional bank, which could 
provide high-risk investments to projects that have high upfront costs, 
resulted in Invest-NL (founded in 2020). 
4.3. United Kingdom: from ‘the greenest government ever’ to a bonfire of 
subsidies 
Our chronology of subsidies in the United Kingdom reveal how the 
most important policies and policy-making have been happening at the 
national level (see Fig. 6). This manifested, first of all, in subsidy 
schemes for renewable energy. At launch the subsidies usually played an 
enabling role; their closure was an impeding factor for the renewable 
energy sector. 
Our chronology begins with the Renewables Obligation (came into 
effect in 2002), which replaced the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO)6 
as the primary revenue support for renewable generation. This scheme 
required electricity supply (i.e. retail) companies to surrender Renew-
able Obligation Certificates (ROCs) covering a certain percentage of the 
energy supplied to customers or pay a penalizing buy-out price. This was 
intended to create a demand, and a market price, for ROCs, which were 
granted freely to owners of registered renewable generation assets ac-
cording to the amount of energy these produced. 
These efforts paved the phase for a phase of ‘The greenest govern-
ment ever’ from 2010 to 2015. Following further work on imple-
mentation, the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) scheme was launched in April 2010. 
It supported renewable generation installations of up to 5 MW capacity 
by mandating that electricity suppliers provide an inflation indexed 
payment per kWh generated (and an additional payment per kWh 
exported to the grid) for a twenty-five year period following registration 
with the scheme. By the end of the FIT scheme’s first year, 30,201 in-
stallations were participating in the FIT, of which 29,556 (77.7 MW) 
were Solar PV, 1339 (18.9 MW) Wind, and 203 Hydro (9.9 MW) [55]. 
During this time, solar energy in particular took off. As Fig. 7 shows, 
until the end of 2013, most solar PV capacity installed was supported by 
the FIT and consisted of installations under 4kW in size — the scale 
typical of residential rooftop installations. Indeed, the vast majority of 
FIT installations by number were domestic Solar PV systems. Hundreds 
of thousands of households became grid connected electricity generators 
during the first few years of the scheme, some supported by ‘rent-a-roof’ 
schemes offered by private companies such as HomeSun, which had 
already launched its scheme by July 2010 [56]. Supported by the high 
initial level of the FIT, these were schemes in which the company 
installed roof-top solar panels at no (or very low) cost to the homeowner, 
retaining ownership of the hardware and receiving the FIT payments. 
The homeowner meanwhile benefitted from free use of the electricity 
produced. 
During the period 2010–2014 the overall trend for community en-
ergy was very much influenced by government subsidies i.e. FIT scheme. 
According to one interviewee, before it came in, community groups 
were doing mainly energy efficiency work, but that “flipped around a bit 
with FIT which gave people a business model to do renewables”; with the end 
of FIT that changed again (UK07). Moreover, two effects of the financial 
crisis were favourable to raising money for projects through community 
shares — “the financial crash […] led to a decline in trust in the banks 
and very low interest rates. People were therefore open to the idea of 
community shares” [58]; p. 14). 
The coalition government had made some commitment to support 
community energy: the Rural Community Energy Fund (RCEF); a 
“community energy revolution in the UK” pledge, followed by Com-
munity Energy Strategy 2014 [59] and launching Urban Community 
Energy Fund (UCEF) in 2014 which, like the RCEF, offered grants and 
loans for pre-planning development work [60]. After the Community 
Energy strategy 2014 was published by the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC), the government was encouraging local au-
thorities to support community energy projects, and to be more active in 
energy provisions. This led to the increasing role for local authorities in 
financing renewable energy projects. Institutional investors also played 
a big part after 2014, e.g. UK local authority pension funds, insurance 
and pension companies. 
Along with setting up the Green Investment Bank (launched in 
2012), the coalition government had been developing a programme of 4 https://www.greendeals.nl/nieuws/regionale-energiefondsen-en-invest-nl- 
pakken-financiering-grote-energieprojecten-samen-op.  
5 However, institutional investors (generally large scale investors e.g. pension 
funds, insurance institutions) are currently not participating in crowdfunding 
due to the substantial transaction costs involved in investing relatively smaller 
sums across multiple projects. 
6 The NFFO was the UK’s first price support policy for renewable generation 
and was introduced by the Electricity Act 1989 which also privatised the 
electricity supply industry [68]. 
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Fig. 5. SDE + subsidy for wind parks at sea and the share of electricity production from wind. SDE + subsidy for wind parks at sea decrease over time, while the 
share of electricity production from wind slowly rises. *relative to total electricity production in the Netherlands, in % of the end usage. Data: CBS, 2020. 
Fig. 6. A timeline of renewable energy subsidies and financing in the United Kingdom, 2000 to 2021.  
Fig. 7. Cumulative Solar PV capacity in the UK by installation size and support mechanism. 
Source: Modified from [57]. 
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‘Electricity Market Reform’ (EMR) which culminated in December 2013 
with the assent of the Energy Act 2013. Along with a carbon price floor 
and emissions standards this introduced a Capacity Market and ‘Con-
tracts for Difference’ (CfD). CfDs were intended to replace the Renew-
ables Obligation as the main state support for deployment of large scale 
renewable and nuclear generation. Attracting new kinds of investor to 
energy generation infrastructure, including institutional investors, was a 
key goal in the formulation of this policy [10,61,62]. 
While the government worked to channel new investment into 
renewable energy with the GIB and EMR, a quite different market for 
investment in renewables was being developed with the emergence of 
crowdfunding platforms – a mechanism for raising capital from large 
number of small investors. In 2011, a crowdfunding start-up, Abundance 
Generation, became the first platform to receive authorisation from the 
FSA; it was also the first platform in the UK focused on raising capital for 
renewable generation projects. This was followed by other platforms – 
the Trillion Fund, Gen Community, Ethex. 
However, from 2015 to 2019 a policy change marked a new phase in 
RE financing. It was widely reported in November 2013 that Cameron 
had told aides he wanted to “get rid of all the green crap” in reference to 
the various levies on energy bills which had been introduced to support 
the greening of the energy sector [63,64]. While veracity of the quote 
was disputed by Downing Street, it does crudely describe the policies the 
government would actually adopt under Cameron’s leadership over the 
next few years, particularly after the Coalition was replaced by a Con-
servative government in May 2015. 
This led to a “bonfire of subsidies”. A series of policy changes 
significantly cut subsidies for the development of new onshore wind and 
solar PV installations at all scales. In a sign of things to come, the gov-
ernment had announced in May 2014 that the RO would close to solar 
PV installations over 5 MW at the end of March 2015, two years earlier 
than planned [65]. While the export tariff would be unchanged under 
the proposals, the cuts to the generation tariff were between 87% for the 
smallest PV installations to 76% for the largest, while wind above 1.5 
MW was to lose the generation tariff completely. In July 2018 the 
government announced that the FIT would be closed from April 2019. 
Another important policy that affected renewable energy generation 
was about tax relief structures/venture capital schemes and certain 
energy generation activities: in 2015 the government excluded subsi-
dized generation of renewable energy by community energy organiza-
tions and activities from Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), Seed EIS 
(SEIS), and Venture Capital Trust (VCT), and from the future enlarge-
ment of Social Investment Tax Relief (SITR). These tax relief structures 
(EIS, VCT) played an important part in building the financial justifica-
tion for investment in solar projects in the UK. 
These changes provoked resistance from a wide range of actors, but 
their efforts had limited impact on policy, and there was a marked drop 
in the deployment of onshore wind and solar, while offshore wind ca-
pacity continued to grow. Demand for Corporate Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPAs) increased, which helped make the business case for 
some new onshore developments. Meanwhile, the costs of onshore wind 
and solar PV continued to fall, as did the cost of battery storage tech-
nology leading to the emergence of hybrid solar/storage sites and the 
first unsubsidized solar PV and wind sites. This led to the current era of 
the United Kingdom that can be marked as “subsidy free renewables” 
when the projects that were announced as subsidy free started 
happening (mainly solar). 
From January 2020, the Smart Export Guarantee (SEG) scheme has 
been brought in to replace the FIT scheme, to encourage investments in 
renewable technology and reduce carbon emissions for achieving net 
zero carbon emissions by 2050. The scheme is seen as less lucrative/ 
favourable. In contrast to FIT, SEG does not have a universal payment 
amount (must be above zero); there is a single payment for exported 
electricity compared to FIT which had two payments – for generated 
electricity and estimated exported electricity; payment tariffs depend on 
chosen electricity supplier rather than a fixed tariff; requires smart 
meters capable of 30 min readings for exported electricity. 
5. Discussion: Shifting patterns of temporality, authority, and 
tension in financing pathways 
Looking inductively across our case studies and data, three distinct 
themes emerge that we elaborate on here: one of temporality, or 
fundamental changes in financing schemes over time; one on authority, 
and the decentralization and often distribution of control; and one on 
contestation, conflicts and tensions within financing regimes. 
5.1. Temporality: Fundamental changes in financing over time 
Studying temporality (i.e. the changes of a case over time) brings into 
focus salient underlying dynamics and drivers to financing. Sections 4.1- 
4.3 indicate that indeed the temporality of subsidization and financing 
in each of the three countries is complex, and irreducible to a single 
factor. 
For example, over the period examined Poland shifted from a pattern 
of an absence of funding for renewables to public support all the way to a 
current boom in prosumers and more market based investment models. 
There are several important milestones that determined the direction of 
the field’s evolution. Over this time, Poland gained access to European 
funds through Poland’s joining the EU, and it introduced a legal status of 
prosumer within the RES Act (2015) and its further amendments (esp. 
2019). An impactful “My Electricity” program offering subsidies to in-
dividual prosumers was also launched. Growing awareness of the 
climate crisis, air pollution related health issues, and of vibrant devel-
opment of renewable energy technologies, created certain public and 
civil pressure on Polish governments and legislators. External (EU) and 
internal (public opinion, grassroots civic movements) stress undoubt-
edly played a role in the process of RES Act development and negoti-
ating. Auction mechanisms, tax relief, net metering and finally 
prosumerism, all new in the Polish energy context, created opportunities 
for new actors (e.g., prosumers, first attempts to establish energy co-
operatives, ESCO firms, PV service providers). Sharp growth of the 
number of prosumers in Poland since 2019 (resulted from the success of 
the “My Electricity” program) indicates that the trend will likely 
continue. However, subsidies are still the dominant financial instrument 
and Polish renewable energy market is still dependent on them. 
In the Netherlands, over the last two decades, the energy system 
gradually shifted from subsidization towards financing. The effect of 
innovation stimulation subsidies such as SDE, SDE+ and SDE++ made 
renewable energy more profitable over time. This decreased the de-
pendency of renewable energy on national subsidy mechanisms. The 
sale of utility shares around 2010–2012 opened up large regional energy 
funds for municipalities and regional authorities. This sale was accom-
panied with a market-oriented mindset in local authorities, arisen 
against the background of budget cuts in municipal budgets due to the 
financial crisis of 2008/2009. The temporality of Dutch subsidies belies 
shifting priorities and fundamental logics within the subsidy regime. It 
exhibits increasing for-profit logic within community as well as state 
spheres, and increasing privatization of the field. The liberalization had 
changed the government role towards stimulating a free market, rather 
than own and manage utilities and government’s attitude towards RE, i. 
e. moving away from subsidization towards financing/investing (e.g. 
through Invest-NL). 
In the United Kingdom, we see a similar political trend and an even 
greater contrast in evolution of subsidization for renewables, i.e. a 
notable shift from wanting to be the ‘greenest government ever’ to 
getting rid of subsidies and heading towards a ‘subsidy-free’ environ-
ment. This overall trend did coincide with the rise of community actors 
and the growing role of local authorities in financing renewable energy 
projects and a search for new business models. When the government 
subsidy policy for renewable energy has changed dramatically, the cuts 
to support for renewable generation was a ‘shock’ for the actors active in 
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relation to renewable energy and posed a particular threat to continued 
investment from the non-traditional actors. The threat to community 
energy and crowdfunding was particularly strong, and as some in-
terviewees pointed out, real damage was done to these sectors by the cuts. 
For community renewables it meant a serious slow-down in the formation of 
new groups and a move towards buying up existing operational renewable 
projects over constructing new ones. For some crowdfunding platforms this 
meant diversifying away from wind and solar PV. A further blow for 
community energy specifically came in July 2016 when the UCEF was 
shut down early. Overall, in the UK, until market circumstances (in 
particular, falling costs of solar PV and wind) allowed the recent 
emergence of the ‘subsidy free’ phase, it was largely the presence of 
subsidies from the central government which enabled/incentivised any 
investment in wind and solar PV. On the other hand, there was a plau-
sible connection between the removal of government subsidies and the 
rise in PPAs (contractual arrangements whereby an organization buys 
electricity for its own use more or less directly from specific generators), 
which offer a market based way to manage risk of investors in genera-
tion capacity. 
Essentially, Poland shifted from low levels of subsidization to a 
relative abundance of subsidies, whereas the UK headed in the opposite 
direction, scaling back subsidies and placing more emphasis on viable 
business models. The Netherlands wasn’t as extreme in their temporal-
ity, but did see a shift in the instruments being utilized, from state 
subsidies towards more market based financing mechanisms. 
5.2. Authority: Decentralization and shifting control 
Each of our three cases also reveals changes in the institutional 
environment for renewable energy financing and increased ‘inclusivity’ 
of actors. This includes the increasing role for local authorities in 
financing renewable energy projects, institutional investors interested in 
opportunities associated with climate change, and small players e.g. 
citizens usually investing through share offers or crowdfunding. 
In Poland, the actors financing renewable energy are represented by 
public institutions from different government levels offering grants and 
subsidies, but also individuals and companies. Among them, (1) state- 
level public institutions managing public funds, such as The National 
Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management (NFEPWM), 
and respective Ministries; as well as (2) regional and local public in-
stitutions managing public funds on the level of voivodeships, cities, and 
municipalities. Significant proportion of the subsidies and loans for 
renewable energy, especially for the companies and municipalities, are 
distributed through the Regional Operational Program and managed on 
the level of voivodeships. However, The National Fund for Environ-
mental Protection and Water Management is the most important actor 
responsible for management of these funds. 
The rapid rise in the number of prosumers observed from 2019 shows 
the impact of the subsidy program “My Electricity” addressed to indi-
vidual households. For the first time, Poles on a mass scale decided to get 
involved in energy prosumerism. Although the forms of subsidy and of 
preferential loan are dominant, we observe a growing number of actors 
who try to introduce new and innovative financial models, such as en-
ergy investment cooperatives or Energy Performance Contracting (EPC). 
Rising energy prices and transposition of RED II directive are likely to 
strengthen this trend in 2021 and beyond. 
It is also expected that the legal status of collective prosumers will be 
introduced in the upcoming amendments to the RES Act, in order to 
facilitate the use of the prosumer mechanisms by multi-family buildings 
residents. 
In the Netherlands, decentralization occurred on two instances: an 
increasing role for decentral authorities and the increasing acknowl-
edgement of citizens as important players in the energy transition. 
Firstly, local and regional authorities gained substantial financial re-
sources to direct the energy transition through the sale of their utility 
shares. This sale led to the rise of regional energy funds. These funds 
radically shifted the role of the local and regional governments, from a 
small player holding utility shares in the wings of a national subsidy 
scheme, to a central player with vast funds to finance the energy tran-
sition. Furthermore, local and regional authorities were institutionalized 
as important players in realizing the energy transition in the national 
Energy Agreement of 2013. The regional energy funds and the Energy 
Agreement put the local and regional governments as central players in 
the energy transition. 
Secondly, citizens have become an increasingly important player in 
financing the energy transition through participation in energy co-
operatives and crowdfunding. The institutionalization of citizen 
participation in the Energy Agreement of 2013 gave citizen engagement 
another impetus. After that, other actors, such as banks, started to 
consider cooperatives as professionals. Nevertheless, the Dutch crowd-
funding sector remains small, despite efforts to professionalize through a 
trade organization. This is mostly because of the countervailing power of 
the vast financial sector and increasingly little encouragement from the 
national government after 2016. 
The professionalization of the crowdfunding sector and energy co-
operatives in particular has transformed the cultural-cognitive beliefs/ 
norms that incumbent parties had towards citizen engagement. For 
example, as explained by one interviewee, the general attitude of banks 
towards citizen engagement changed, considering them no longer as 
‘private individuals’ but as professional business customers. “who, 
together, become so professional that they can take on quite large projects”. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom, there is a diversity of actors and 
shifting forms of control as well. The actors that were entering the 
renewable energy finance over the period covered in this study, are 
connected with different institutional fields, and different financial and 
subsidy mechanisms. It is particularly interesting to see the activities of 
non-traditional actors whose role in renewable energy finance was 
becoming more prominent at certain stages of development, in response 
to some policy changes or changes in the institutional environment (e.g. 
financial markets). 
For example, after the Community Energy strategy 2014 was pub-
lished, the government encouraged local authorities to support com-
munity energy projects, and to be more active in energy provisions more 
generally. This led to the increasing role for local authorities in financing 
renewable energy projects. Institutional investors also started playing a 
big part after 2014, e.g. UK local authority pension funds, insurance and 
pension company; by 2018 private institutional investors had started to 
take substantial shares of projects still under construction. The devel-
opment of financial mechanisms empowered small players (e.g. citizens) 
offering investment opportunities and ways to support renewable en-
ergy. The rise of crowdfunding (as well as community energy projects) 
resulted in increased citizen engagement in financing wind and solar 
projects and changed the role of citizens from consumers to investors. 
Although the investor role itself was not new to the field but it was 
innovative in respect to citizens. This illustrates a change within the 
current system of roles. Another example is the change in the govern-
ment’s role as a provider of financial support as the sector was moving to 
subsidy-free renewables. 
A final insight related to authority and control is a tension between 
European pressures and policies and local and national pressures and 
policies. In some instances, such as the European wide emissions trading 
scheme, European Union efforts have a synergistic effect on renewable 
energy, helping promote wind and solar within particular sectors and 
industries. In this way, national mechanisms implement European di-
rectives, especially Directive 2009/28/EC that mandated levels of 
renewable energy use within the European Union from 2009 to 2021. 
However, such top-down pressure from the European Commission is 
significantly shaped by national and sub-national policies and the ad hoc 
goals of governmental and central agencies—a trend that helps explain 
why each of our three countries pursue different financial mechanisms 
pathways but also have very different characteristics (Poland inter-
vening in its market vacuum to try to catch up in terms of its renewable 
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energy policy; the Netherlands moving from state support to tends; the 
UK seeking to minimize public support for renewables in lieu of private 
sector involvement). This reminds us both that varied financial mech-
anism configurations can respond to local needs but also hinder diffu-
sion [66]. 
In sum, our three cases reveal how renewable energy financing 
represents not only a site of investment or financial disbursement, it also 
becomes a site of polycentric involvement with the scope to engage with 
consumers and communities themselves. Poland sees a strong rise in 
prosumers via their “My Electricity” program; the Netherlands in public- 
based crowdfunding; the UK – crowdfunding and efforts at stimulating 
community energy. 
5.3. Contestation: Tension and conflicted development 
Studying contestations (i.e. disagreements between actors) allows us 
to also study the winners, losers, and ever shifting power relations 
involved in financing efforts. Perhaps due in part to the temporal 
dynamism inherent in subsidy and financing trends, and also to the 
shifting contours of control and authority, each of our cases also see 
salient degrees of contestation and at times even conflict. 
In Poland, the introduction and evolution of different financial and 
investment mechanisms for renewable energy depended on the evolving 
public policies, which often provoked heated debates and contestation. 
The two most important voices in these debates represent, on the one 
hand, advocates of sustaining the status quo – both in regards of 
dominant fuel type and organizational structure of the energy system, 
and on the other hand – advocates of evolution towards decentralized 
and low-carbon energy systems. For decades, the first position was 
dominant, which was reflected in the limited support for renewable 
energy development. 
The struggles for the final shape of the RES Act in February 2015 
represents this tension well. After years of delay under the government 
of liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) party in coalition with the 
agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL), the Act was accepted months 
before the next election, in October 2015, and was to come into force in 
January 2016, after the election. The Act provided the legal definition of 
prosumerism. The system of the prosumers’ support raised contro-
versies. Supporters of decentralization of the energy system lobbied for 
FIT as the best system of encouraging private investments in RES. 
Greenpeace was one of the organizations engaged in campaigning for 
this solution. A broad coalition of social actors, such as NGOs, agricul-
ture and rural organizations, Association of Rural Municipalities, and 
Polish Economic Chamber of the Electromechanical Industries sup-
ported FIT, while incumbent energy companies were against it. The 
main ruling party, Civic Platform, did not support this solution and 
proposed net-metering instead. However, its coalition partner PSL voted 
together with opposition to pass FIT. The main author of the critical 
amendment (so-called “Bramora’s Amendment”), PSL MP Artur Bra-
mora, presented this financial mechanism as an opportunity for wide 
civic participation in energy production, particularly attractive for res-
idents of rural areas, that is, PSL traditional electorate. FIT with guar-
anteed prices for 15 years was intended to enable prosumers to use 
traditional bank loans to cover investment costs. 
Assuming that law would have come into force as planned, some land 
owners decided to invest in the PV micro-installations. However, after 
the parliamentary election in 2015, conservative-populistic party Law 
and Justice (PiS) formed the new government and, despite the fact that 
they supported FIT while in parliamentary opposition, few months later 
they withdrew their support and enacted a net-metering system instead 
of FIT. That undermined the trust of the actors connected and dependent 
on the SIE-field of finance and investment mechanisms, such as potential 
prosumers, firms from the sector, and commercial banks granting loans 
for PV micro-installations. Lack of trust and transparency in the process 
of policy-making remains an important problem in the relations between 
policy-makers and other actors in the field. 
The Act on Investments in Wind Farms 2016, which has substantially 
slowed down wind energy in Poland, also illustrates some controversies 
over wind energy developments. The new law was officially motivated 
by the health and safety concerns and the public protests against wind 
turbines in the neighbourhoods. However, the social protest had very 
limited scale. It seems likely that the growing wind capacity was difficult 
to absorb by the grid operators, while the low electricity prices in windy 
periods posed unwanted competitions for incumbents. 
In the Netherlands, contestation is especially prevalent around topics 
of subsidization, ownership and liberalization. For example, contesta-
tion arose around the emergence of regional energy funds. According to 
left-wing politicians, unbundling the regional and local energy author-
ities would lead to an influx of international influence in local areas. 
According to those in favour of the sale, the liberalization of the energy 
authorities would end an era of ‘being mad-Hank’ and the beginning of 
an era of being ‘smarter with money’, according to an alderman of 
Amsterdam as cited in a newspaper article by Verbraeken & Trappen-
burg [54]. 
Furthermore, contestation arose around the launch of national pro-
motional bank Invest-NL. Here, the argument was posed that a national 
promotional bank and the subsequent centralisation of financial gov-
ernment institutions would lead to a more efficient financial instrument. 
However, as noted by one interviewee, the centralisation of these in-
stitutions was prohibited by the institutions in question because the high- 
placed officials of these institutes did not want to lose their power and posi-
tion within the energy system. 
Lastly, there have been several contestations around crowdfunding 
over time. In the beginning, the Ministry of Economics (MoE) and the 
Authority Financial Markets (AFM) wanted to allow plenty space for the 
novel instrument to develop, and allowed for regulatory derogation that 
enabled crowdfunding platforms to develop. However, an interviewee 
stated that around 2016 the MoE and AFM became increasingly sceptical 
about crowdfunding platforms, as they started to perceive them as a potential 
threat to unknowing citizens. As such, the regulatory space of crowdfunding 
platforms was retracted as they became more intensively supervised and 
regulated by the AFM. 
The UK case clearly demonstrates that field actors often have diverse 
and contradictory aims and interests, with main contestations provoked 
by policy and regulation changes. When a series of policy changes 
significantly cut subsidies for the development of new onshore wind and 
solar PV installations, this resulted in expressions of concern, objections, 
and push-back from field actors ranging from institutional investors to 
community energy groups, but there were differences in emphasis in the 
responses reflecting different interests, and differences in the arguments 
they used to make their case, reflecting their different capacities. While 
the policy changes provoked resistance from a wide range of actors, their 
efforts had limited impact on policy, and there was a marked drop in the 
deployment of onshore wind and solar, while offshore wind capacity 
continued to grow. Institutional investors were among those with con-
cerns about the turn taken by the government’s renewable energy pol-
icy. The adoption and use of crowdfunding platforms that started 
providing finance for renewable energy generation projects, was also 
affected by changes in government support which reduced investor 
confidence, and proved especially challenging to the crowdfunding 
platforms, leading to stakeholder conflict. 
Another example is when a change in the regulation of Cooperatives 
in 2014 caused disruption and was particularly disturbing to some 
existing energy cooperatives. Legislation in 2010 and 2014 had intro-
duced Cooperatives and Community Benefit Societies as the successors 
to Industrial and Provident Societies. In brief, community benefit soci-
eties exist for the benefit of the community while cooperatives exist for 
the benefit of their members. The difficulty arose when the Financial 
Conduct Authority stopped allowing energy cooperatives to register as 
Cooperatives in 2014 and questioned the legal status of those which 
already had. The debate turned on the extent to which an organisation 
must trade goods or services with its members to be considered a bone 
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fide cooperative – renewable electricity coops generally do not sell 
electricity to their members for practical reasons [67]. According to one 
interviewee, there was a divergence of view within the cooperative movement 
. Cooperative renewable electricity generators found themselves on one side of 
an ‘ideological’ contest within the wider co-operative movement and, to their 
frustration, found the FCA aligned with the other side. In response to this, 
they were able to enlist the support of figures within the broader 
co-operative movement but, so far, to no avail. This contest was not over 
the inclusion of electricity generation activities per se, but rather the 
extent to which a co-op must trade with its members, something which 
the structure of the electricity market makes difficult for co-operative 
generators. 
To summarize, even though renewable energy systems have plentiful 
economic, social, and environmental benefits briefly mentioned in 
Section 2, financing patterns towards them are not free from conflict. All 
three of our cases, even those with very large sources of offshore wind 
(UK) or onshore wind and solar (NL) exhibit battles and contestations 
between actors such as banks, government ministries, civil society 
groups, investors, hosting communities, and even energy users them-
selves. Financing thus not only redistributes money, it shifts politics and 
power, making it inherently contested. 
6. Conclusion 
Our comparative, mixed-methods assessment of financing and sub-
sidies for renewable energy in three European countries yields fruitful 
insights concerning renewable energy, innovation, and policy. 
First, the trends behind financial mechanisms for renewable energy 
are both complicated and fast moving. It is not only technological pa-
rameters and balance of system costs for wind and solar that are 
dramatically changing; the field of how such technologies are financed is 
complex and constituted by a number of sub-fields and institutions 
concerned with changing social relations in connection to financing of 
wind and solar that can be part of other fields, i.e. ‘municipal energy’; 
‘community energy’; ‘investment-based crowdfunding’; ‘institutional 
investment in green infrastructure’; ‘corporate’ and ‘private wire’ PPAs. 
Although some discuss how subsidies can impede innovation, in our 
cases subsidies represent more enabling than impeding factors. This 
finding also resonates strongly with global trends in renewable energy 
financing, where capital markets, bonds, and other financial institutions 
are beginning to invest in the sector (and divest from other sectors, 
notably fossil fuels). In simpler terms: the diversity of financing in-
struments and increase in financing volumes are commensurate with 
global goals of decarbonization and climate change mitigation. 
Secondly, our analysis reveals important patterns of innovation. Our 
cases show not only traditional financial mechanisms employed for the 
new goal, that is, enabling newcomers to conduct investment in 
renewable energy and thus engage in energy transition, but also entirely 
new, innovative, market-based financial mechanisms. Subsidies and 
preferential loans are used to develop and support new energy sources, 
and to enable new actors to get involved in energy production. Their 
innovativeness resides in the creation of a more dispersed and decen-
tralized energy system. For instance, their prevalence in Poland results 
from a relative underdevelopment of the field (compared to NL and UK 
case studies), relatively low level of financial saturation and, above all, 
still quite restricted regulatory conditions in the Polish energy sector. 
Moreover, new financial mechanisms are challenging normative and 
cognitive institutions around renewable energy generation – their 
institutionalization is germinating into ‘social standards’ that seek to 
address the social dilemma of climate change mitigation. This form of 
institutionalization allows for legitimization of new actors participating 
in financing renewable energy (citizens, local authorities), making them 
more accepted and trusted by incumbents. 
Third, determining the effectiveness of any particular set of financial 
mechanisms is difficult not only due to the complexity of establishing 
causality between a mechanism and diffusion (because the timing of 
many mechanisms overlaps); but also due to national variation in terms 
of financing over time; shifting control and ownership; and tension and 
contestation in financing pathways. The efficacy of financial mecha-
nisms in this way depends on maturation and cost of technology, but 
also wider institutional context (e.g. market-based economy vs transi-
tion economy). It is determined partly by technology, partly by in-
stitutions, partly by policy, and partly by country context. 
Fourth, and lastly, our studies offer insight for policymaking and 
regulation. The available forms of financial mechanisms in our three 
European countries are strongly dependent on state policy and specific 
legislation. This means that the ability for actors other than the state to 
create transformative change throughout the financial sphere is limited, 
i.e. power is more constrained and circumscribed. State planners and 
government bodies often have direct control over public funds and 
different forms of public subsidies and loans. Indirectly, policymakers 
influence renewable energy finance by shaping organisational aspects of 
renewable energy (e.g. regulating energy co-ops) or setting the rules for 
the financial market (e.g. around tax relief/venture capital schemes). 
The involvement in developing innovative financial mechanisms often 
demands institutional work, such as pioneering new practices, lobbying 
and campaigning for/against relevant policy and regulation. In this way, 
the institutional environment and its governance dynamics can be just as 
important as the specific technology being subsidized, or the particular 
forms of innovation being harnessed. 
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